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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Kyle Steven Bower appeals from the judgment of conviction for two counts of
lewd conduct and one count of sexual abuse following a jury trial.

On appeal,

Mr. Bower asserts that the district court committed legal error when it denied his motion
to sever count two from counts one and three because they were improperly joined. In
denying the motion, the district court mistakenly considered the motion as one made
under Idaho Criminal Rule 14, which it is in the district court's discretion to grant or
deny, rather than Idaho Criminal Rule 8, which involves a legal determination of the
propriety of joinder.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Kyle Steven Bower was charged, by superseding indictment, with two counts of
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and one count of sexual abuse of a child under
sixteen. (R., pp.19-21.) The conduct charged in counts one and three was alleged to
have occurred against K.8. 1 between 2011 and 2012, when she was between the ages
of 13 and 14 years old; the conduct charged in count two was alleged to have occurred
against J.B. 2 in 2004, when she was between the ages of 10 and 11 years old.
(R., p.20.) Count one, involving K.B., alleged "manual to genital and/or genital to genital
contact," while count two, involving J.B. alleged "manual to genital contact." (R., p.20.)
Count three, involving K.B., alleged "manual to breast contact." (R., p.20.)

1

K.B. is the biological daughter of Mr. Bower. (Tr., p.277, Ls.3-13.)
J.B. considered Mr. Bower to be her main father figure, as her biological father was
not involved in her early life, and although they never married, Mr. Bower and her
mother spent nine years together. (Tr., p.485, L.19- p.487, L.21.)

2

1

Mr. Bower filed a Motion to Sever count two from counts one and three, asserting
that the facts and circumstances are "separate and apart from each other," the victims
are different, the incidents were alleged to have occurred years apart, and "[h]aving
these counts together will highly prejudice" Mr. Bower.

(R., p.39.) The district court

denied the Motion to Sever, concluding that "Defendant has failed to make a prima facie
showing that any of the factors identified by the Idaho appellate courts as justifying
severance are present in this case." (R., p.53.)
Following a jury trial, Mr. Bower was found guilty of all three counts. (Tr., p. 750,
L.6 - p.751, L.4.) Mr. Bower filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.295.)

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bower's motion to sever because the
allegations in count two were not based on the same act or transaction or part of a
"common scheme or plan" to commit the allegations in counts one and three?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bower's Motion To Sever Because The
Conduct Alleged In Count Two Was Not Based On The Same Act Or Transaction Or
Part Of A "Common Scheme Or Plan" To Commit The Conduct Alleged In Counts One
And Three

A

Introduction
In denying Mr. Bower's motion to sever count two - which contained allegations

concerning a different alleged victim and conduct that purportedly occurred more than
six years before the allegations in counts one and three - the district court committed
legal error. The district court's analysis was based on the misunderstanding that the
motion to sever was one brought under Idaho Criminal Rule 14, rather than a claim that
the original joinder was improper under Idaho Criminal Rule 8. Regardless of the basis
for its decision to deny the motion to sever, the district court erred in doing so as the
conduct alleged in count two was not based on the same act or transaction or part of a
common scheme or plan to commit the conduct alleged in counts one and three.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bower's Motion To Sever Because
The Conduct Alleged In Count Two Was Not Based On The Same Act Or
Transaction Or Part Of A "Common Scheme Or Plan" To Commit The Conduct
Alleged In Counts One And Three
Idaho Criminal Rule 8(a) provides:
Two (2) or more offenses may be charged on the same complaint,
indictment or information and a separate count for each offense if the
offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are based
on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

I.C.R. 8(a) (hereinafter, Rule 8).
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that a claim that charges were
improperly joined under Rule 8 involves both different considerations and a different
standard of review than a motion to sever brought pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 14
4

(hereinafter, Rule 14 ).

See State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226 (1985) ("Parties

properly joined under I.C.R. 8(b) may be severed under !.C.R. 14 if it appears that joint
trial would be prejudicial, and the defendant has the burden of showing such prejudice.")
(citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565-66
(2007) ("[A]n abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of a
motion to sever joinder pursuant to !.C.R. 14; however, that rule presumes joinder was
proper in the first place") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
The bulk of Mr. Bower's motion to sever was centered on the dissimilarities
between the conduct alleged in count two versus that alleged in counts one and three.
Specifically, Mr. Bower noted that "[t]he facts and circumstances surrounding the
Counts are separate and apart from each other," most notably the incidents, the alleged
victims, and the dates for the alleged acts, which were "years apart."3

(R., p.39.)

Mr. Bower's motion to sever constituted a challenge to the propriety of the original
joinder; therefore, review by this Court is free under Rule 8, rather than for an abuse of
discretion under Rule 14. Field, 144 Idaho at 565 ("Whether a court improperly joined
offenses pursuant to !.C.R. 8 is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free
review.") (citations omitted). In light of the argument set forth infra, Mr. Bower asserts
that the district court erred when it denied his motion to sever count two from counts
one and three because the conduct alleged in count two was not based on the same act
or transaction or part of a "common scheme or plan" to commit the conduct alleged in
counts one and three. 4

3

One of the four reasons given was not subject to Rule 8 analysis, namely, "Having
these counts together will highly prejudice defendant." (R., p.39.)
4 Mr. Bower will focus on the "common scheme or plan" analysis, as it cannot be argued
that count two involved the same act or transaction as counts one and three.
5

In denying Mr. Bower's motion to sever, the district court appears to have
misunderstood this Court's interpretation of Rule 14 when considering improperly-joined
charges or co-defendants, despite the fact that the State cited Field during argument
(Tr., p.5, Ls.13-20), and that the district court itself mentioned Rule 8 and severance
when it parenthetically described State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 824 (Ct. App. 1999).
(R., p.52.) Ultimately, the district court concluded that its decision was discretionary
(R., p.51 ), and deciding that severance was not warranted, reasoned,
The court concludes that Defendant has failed to make a prima facie
showing that any of the factors identified by the Idaho appellate courts as
justifying severance are present in this case. There is no indication that
the jury will confuse and cumulate the evidence relevant to the various
counts. In fact, it would appear that the difference in the alleged victims
and the great variance in dates between Count II and Counts I and Ill
would militate against a finding that the jury would be confused on the
evidence presented on the different counts in this case.
(R., p.53 (emphasis added).) 5
In Field, this Court explained, "Cases discussing common plans have focused on
whether the offenses were one continuing action or whether the offenses have sufficient
common elements including the type of sexual abuse, the circumstances under which
the abuse occurred, and the age of the victims."

Field, 144 Idaho at 565.

The

defendant in Field was charged with having manual-to-genital contact with a seven year

5

The district court also concluded, with a single sentence of analysis, "In addition, the
State made at least a prima facie showing that evidence of Defendant's conduct in
Count II would be admissible in a trial on Counts I and Ill and vice versa." (R., p.54.)
One problem with the district court's analysis is that it fell well short of this Court's
admonition that, when considering Rule 404(b) evidence, "trial courts must carefully
scrutinize evidence offered as 'corroboration' or as demonstrating a 'common scheme
or plan' in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that is merely probative
of defendant's propensity to engage in criminal behavior." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,
53 (2009). Furthermore, as this Court has explained, "whether evidence would have
been admissible absent the joinder is only a factor in determining whether a proper
joinder is prejudicial and not whether joinder is proper in the first place." Field, 144
Idaho at 565 n.2 (citation omitted).
6

old girl in 2003, and having rubbed the buttocks of a 17 year old girl in 2001. Id. at 566.
Before the district court, the

argued that joinder was appropriate because "the

offenses constitute a common scheme because Field asked the individual girls to come
near him, began to 'innocently' touch them and then put his hand down their pants." Id.
On appeal, the State added an additional reason that joinder was appropriate: "that
Field had a plan to take advantage of underage girls that come into his home to babysit
or be babysat." Id.
In rejecting the State's argument and finding joinder improper under Rule 8, this
Court

reasoned,

"the

incidents

occurred

at

different

times,

under

different

circumstances, and involved different parties with significantly different ages." Id. This
Court further explained, 'These separate acts did not constitute part of a common
scheme or plan. There is nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense
against T.B. he had a plan to also commit an offense against H.P .... [or] against
someone he would be 'babysitting' two years later." Id. This Court noted that while
both victims were minors, they "had different ages (one was a young child, the other
was almost an adult), the type of sexual contact was different (digital vaginal penetration
and the rubbing of buttocks), and the incidents occurred two years apart," while the
similarities, "that both girls were only temporarily in the household, that the acts
occurred in Field's home, and that the abuse began with 'innocent' touching" were
"insufficient to prove a common scheme or plan." Id. at 566-67.
Interpreting the similar Federal Criminal Rule of Procedure 8, 6 the Ninth Circuit
has explained that its "common scheme or plan" language requires an examination of

6

The key difference between Idaho's Rule 8 and the federal version is that the plain
language of the federal rule is far more liberal, allowing for joinder when the offenses
"are of the same or similar character" even if they are not based on the same act or
7

"whether '[c]omission of one of the offenses [ ]either depended upon [ ]or necessarily
led to the commission of the other; proof of the one act [ ]either constituted [ ]or
depended upon proof of the other."' United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 565, 574 (9th
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 429 (2d Cir. 1978)) (brackets
in original).
In State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664 (2010), interpreting the term "common
scheme or plan" in assessing the admissibility of other acts evidence under Rule 404(b)
in a lewd conduct prosecution, this Court provided guidance as to the meaning and
scope of the term "common scheme or plan." Johnson was charged with three counts
of lewd conduct, alleged to have been committed against his daughter when she was
six to seven years old. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 666. The charges concerned allegations
that Johnson had engaged the victim in manual-to-genital contact, oral-to-genital
contact, and attempted sexual intercourse through genital-to-genital contact. Id. Over
Johnson's objection, the State was allowed to introduce evidence that Johnson "had
molested his younger sister when she was approximately eight years old and he was
between fifteen and sixteen," with such abuse consisting mainly of "Johnson exposing
himself to his sister and requesting that she expose herself to him," with one instance of
manual-to-genital contact. Id. at 667.
This Court first acknowledged its recent decision in Grist, noting, "It reiterated
that bad acts may only be admitted 'if relevant to prove ... a common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of
one tends to establish the other, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

transaction or part of a common scheme or plan. Compare F.R.Cr.P. 8(a) with I.C.R.
8(a).
8

accident."'

Id. at 668 (quoting Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55) (emphasis in original).

Summarizing its holding, this Court explained, "In other words, at a minimum, there
must be evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that sexual
misconduct has occurred with children in the past." Id.
In allowing the evidence to be presented, the district court had found three
characteristics that provided a link between the prior acts and the pending charges: "(1)
both victims were about seven to eight years old; (2) both victims viewed Johnson as an
'authority figure' because he was an older brother or father; [and] (3) both courses of
conduct involved Johnson requesting the victim to touch his penis."

Id. at 669.

In

finding admission of the prior acts improper, this Court explained, "These similarities,
however, are sadly far too unremarkable to demonstrate a 'common scheme or plan' in
Johnson's behavior. The facts that the two victims in this case are juvenile females and
that Johnson is a family member are precisely what make these incidents unfortunately
quite ordinary." Id.
In State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 304 P.3d 276 (2013), this Court summarized the
rule it clarified in Grist and affirmed in Johnson as follows:
[T]o be admissible under Rule 404(b ), evidence of prior misconduct must
show more than a superficial similarity to the nature and details of the
charged conduct, but must instead show that the defendant's charged and
uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the inference that the
prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the
charged offense.
Joy, 155 Idaho at_, 304 P.3d at 285 (emphasis added).

No evidence was offered that the alleged abuse of J.B. in 2004 "was planned as
part of a course of conduct leading up to" the alleged abuse of K.B. in 2011 and 2012.
It would be illogical to conclude that the alleged abuse in 2004 of a different victim of a
different age in a different manner and with a different relationship to Mr. Bower was
9

perpetrated in order to commit the later alleged abuse in 2011 and 201
1

See Field,

Idaho at 566 ("There is nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense

against T.B. he had a plan to also commit an offense against H.P . . . . [or] against
someone he would be 'babysitting' two years later").
Assuming that it is appropriate to go beyond the interpretation of the "common
scheme or plan" language from Rule 8 provided by this Court in Field, or the similar
interpretation of "common scheme or plan" for purposes of Idaho Rule of Evidence
404(b) provided by this Court in Joy, the factual differences and the number of years
between the conduct alleged in count two and that alleged in counts one and three
make it clear that joinder was legally improper. Aside from the large amount of time
between the incident involving J.B. and K.B. (seven to eight years), the difference in
relationships between Mr. Bower and the alleged victims (K.B. is Mr. Bower's daughter,
while J.B. is the daughter of Mr. Bower's former long-term girlfriend), and the difference
in the conduct alleged (one proceeded to full-blown intercourse, while the other involved
manual-to-genital contact), Mr. Bower notes that the age differences between the two
alleged victims, approximately three years, especially in light of the ages that they were,
compels a finding that count two was improperly joined with counts one and three. 7
Regardless of whether it is the factual differences themselves or the lack of any
evidence that the conduct alleged to have been committed against J.B. in 2004 was part
of a plan to commit the charged offenses against K.B. in 2011 and 2012, the denial of
Mr. Bower's motion to sever was erroneous. Mr. Bower maintains that, in light of the
nature of the charges and the testimony given by both alleged victims, it will be

7

One of the victims in this case, J.B., was 10 or 11 years old, whereas the more recent
victim, K.B., was 13 or 14 years old. (R., p.20.) In short, one victim was a teenager,
while the other was not.
10

impossible for the State to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no prejudice
occurred as a result of the improper joinder. 8 As such, the only appropriate remedy is
for this Court to vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for new,
separate trials.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Bower respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for separate trials.
DATED this 1ih day of June, 2014.

SPENCER J. HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

The prejudice inherent in this type of case, with charges involving multiple victims
improperly joined, is summed up by a review of the transcript of a portion of the
examination of one member of the jury panel in voir dire:
8

Q.

A.
Q.

A.
A.

And so in a case like this, you wouldn't give Kyle a presumption of
innocence?
There's two victims?
Well, that's what they say.
I'd have a hard time, yeah ...
I'd just have a hard time believing somebody when two people
made the same accusation.

(Tr., p.232, L.14 - p.233, L.9.)
11
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